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RESTITUTIONARY RECOVERY OF MONEYS PAID
TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY UNDER A MISTAKE OF
LAW: IGNORANTIA JURIS IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
JOHN D. McCAMUSt

The general rule that moneys paid under a mistake of law can not
be recovered is something of an embarrassment to the common law.
The rule coexists with great difficulty with another general rule to
the effect that moneys paid under a mistake of fact are recoverable.
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact is
notoriously difficult and has proven to be particularly so in this
context. Courts are understandably reluctant to deny recovery of
payments made on the basis of a misunderstanding of the payer's
legal obligations and have often adopted the ruse of labelling as
matters of fact misunderstandings which appear to be distinctly
legal in character. Further, it is generally agreed that the traditional
rationale of the rule, ignorantiajuris non excusat lex, has no relevance in the context of claims to recover money paid in error. For
obvious reasons, ignorance of the law will not usually be counted as
an excuse for failure to comply with the prohibitions of the criminal
law or of other regulatory schemes or for failure to adhere to duties
imposed by the law of torts. It it with good reason that one is
required to conform to laws of this kind, even if one is unaware of
their existence. It is equally obvious that the ancient ignorantiajuris
maxim cannot offer an explanation for the traditional reluctance
of the courts to allow recovery, for example, of moneys expended in
overpayment of taxes or of an excess payment made under a contract where the overpayment results from a mistaken construction
of the agreement or of a statute. Such individuals are not refusing to
obey or comply with the law; they have conferred on the recipient
of their payment an unearned and often unexpected windfall which
t Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
@ John D. McCamus, x983.
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they seek to recover. The payer now devoutly wishes that he had
successfully obeyed or complied with the correct legal interpretation,
and seeks to establish that state of affairs through recovery of the
overpayment.
A more plausible explanation for the rule might be grounded in
the policy of the common law favouring finality in the resolution of
disputes. It would be inconsistent with that policy to allow one who
has agreed to settle a dispute by the making of a payment, to seek
recovery of the payment when it subsequently develops that the
payer proceeded to make the payment on the basis of a misunderstanding of his legal position. Compromise agreements entered into
on the basis of such errors would normally be binding. The payer
would be taken to have assumed the risk of making errors of this
kind. For similar policy reasons it may be argued that in a situation
short of a compromise, a situation referred to by Goff and Jones as
a "voluntary... submission to an honest claim," 1 denial of relief can
be defended on grounds of principle. Persuasive as this may seem,it is not, of course, a basis for a rule denying recovery of payments
made under a mistake of law. The same considerations would be
present whether the error in question was one of fact or law. To be
sure, it may well be that errors of law may be more likely to arise
(or, at least, may be assumed to be more likely to arise) in a dispute
resolution context than would be errors of fact, and this might indeed offer a partial explanation for the emergence of the mistake of
law doctrine. Nonetheless, it is obvious that both mistakes of fact
and mistakes of law can and do arise in this context and that the
policy favouring finality weighs with equal force against recovery
premised on either kind of error.
A rule denying recovery for payments made under a mistake of
law thus appears to represent a striking illustration of what is after
all a not infrequent phenomenon in the growth of the common law,
a rule which is ill-designed to capture within its rubric those cases
touched by its underlying rationale. Only some cases of money paid
under a mistake of law are cases in which the finality of dispute
resolution rationale suggests that recovery should be denied. Moreover, the arguments favouring recovery in these cases are of a kind
1 R. Goff and G. Jones, THE LAW OF RESTrTUTION (2nd ed., 1978) at 30-32,
2

83-85.
It will be suggested that although the principle espoused by Goff and Jones
may usefully explain the decisions in earlier authorities, it is not self-evident
that so broad a principle can be defended on policy grounds. See infra, the
text at notes 99-i0o.
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which have been treated favourably elsewhere by the common law.
Leaving aside payments made to settle disputes, it generally may be
said that the defendant in these cases will have received a windfall
benefit at the plaintiff's expense. The windfall will not only be
unearned but in many cases will have been extracted by an illegitimate or unlawful exercise of statutory power by a public authority.
Both common law and equity developed a host of rules which may
be said to have as their object the removal of windfalls of this sort.
In the present century, this body of rules has been brought together
under the banner of the unjust enrichment principle and is now
generally referred to as the law of restitution.' Whether or not one
accepts the validity of this exercise in restatement and rationalization, it cannot be denied that there exists overwhelming evidence in
the case law that the courts have traditionally abhorred and remedied situations in which one person has gained a windfall benefit
at another's expense.
It is not surprising, then, that a luxuriant undergrowth of exceptions to the general rule denying recovery of payments made under
a mistake of law has developed. Indeed, although this is something
of an exaggeration, it is often said that the exceptions have wholly
encrusted the general rule and that there are no situations, or at
least very few, in which courts can not find a line of argument,
consistent with authority, permitting relief.4 Indeed, Canadian
courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, have made their
own contributions to what appears to be a lengthening list of devices
for avoiding the harsh impact of the general rule.
A long list of exceptions is, of course, the most likely antidote the
common law will develop for an unjust or inelegant rule. It is a
rather unsatisfactory solution in the present case, however, inasmuch
as the exceptions themselves establish an elaborate cluster of artificial distinctions and vague standards for relief which have created
an unusually chaotic body of jurisprudence. The resulting confusion
and the evident reluctance of many judges to completely ignore
earlier authority has meant that the general rule still has a significant capacity for effecting unjust results. The proper disposition of
3 See, generally, American Law Institute, RESTATE.iENT OF THE LAW OF

RESTITUTION (1937); Goff and Jones, supra, note I; G. E. Palmer, THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION (1978, 4 v.); G. H. L. Fridman and J. G. McLeod,
RESTITUTION

(1982).

4 See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Benefits Con-

ferred Under a Mlistake of Law (1981), at 4 o , and references cited therein.
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claims for overpayments to public authorities has proven to be a
matter of particular difficulty.
It is also not surprising that the call for reform has been frequently sounded. The foregoing critique of the general rule is
standard fare in law reviews and in modem texts on contract
and restitution.' For convenience, we may refer to it as the orthodox
attack on the rule. The rule has essentially been abolished by statutory reform enacted first in New Zealand6 and then in Western
Australia, and confined in its operation by legislation enacted in a
number of American states.' In a thoroughly researched and persuasively written report, the Law Reform Commission of British
Columbia has recently recommended the enactment of legislation
based on the New Zealand model.? The advocates of reform,
whether it be by judicial restatement or legislation, almost invariably
recommend the same reform technique: abolition of the distinction
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law. It would be difficult
to identify another private law doctrine which has been so universally condemned or another reform measure which enjoys such
widespread support.
The discerning reader may well wonder whether this moribund,
if not dead, doctrinal horse needs yet another law review flogging.
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, does
suggest that the doctrine still retains at least some of its charm for
judicial minds in high places. Perhaps more importantly, the decision suggests that the explanation for the traditional reluctance
of the courts to embrace the orthodox attack on the general rule
5 The literature is voluminous. For a recent statement of the argument, see
W. E. Knutson, Mistake of Law Payments in Canada: A Mistaken Principle?
(1979) io MAN. L.J. 23.
6 Judicature Amendment Act, 1958, S.N.Z., x958, No. 40, see. 2, for a discussion of which see R. J. Sutton, Mistake of Law-Lifting the Lid of
Pandora'sBox in THE A. G. DAvis EssAYS IN LAW (x965), at 218 et seq.;
D. L. Lange, Statutory Reform of the Law of Mistake (ig8o) 18 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 428; Knutson, supra, note 5, at 42-47.
7 Law Reform (Property, Perpetuities and Succession) Act, 1962, S.W.A.
1962, No. 83, secs. 23 and 24.
8 In 1942, New York enacted legislation stipulating that "[R]elief shall not be
denied merely because the mistake is one of law rather than one of fact".
See New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, sec. 3005. A number of States
have enacted "Field Code" provisions collapsing the distinction between
mistakes of fact and mistakes of law for certain purposes. See, for example,
California Civil Code, sec. 1578. For a discussion of these reforms see:
supra, note 3, at 8o-8x; Lange, supra, note 6, at 465-70; Knutson, supra,
note 5, at 42-47; Fridman and McLeod, supra, note 3, at 170-72.

s Supra, note 4, at 82-84.
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stems from an uneasiness concerning the imposition of restitutionary
liability on public authorities and that this is a matter which may
indeed benefit from some further analysis. In Hydro Electric Commission of the Township of Nepean v. Ontario Hydro"0 the Court
considered a claim brought by a municipal electric power utility to
recover certain charges for power supplied to it by Ontario Hydro.
The charges in question were held to be in excess of those authorized
by Ontario Hydro's enabling statute. The majority of a divided
Court denied the claim on the basis that the moneys had been paid
under a mistake of law and were therefore irrecoverable. In an
elegant and learned dissenting opinion, however, Dickson J., with
Laskin C.J.C. concurring, mounted the orthodox attack on the
general rule, expressed the view that payments made under a mistake
of law should be accorded the same treatment as payments made
under a mistake of fact, and concluded that the municipal utility
should be permitted to recover the excess charges. Before turning to
an assessment of the significance of the Nepean decision and a brief
discussion of the difficulties inherent in the granting of recovery of
this kind against public authorities, it will be useful to offer a brief
account of the general rule and its exceptions and of recent developments pertaining to the rule that moneys paid under a mistake of
fact can be recovered.
The Mistake of Law Doctrine: Origins and Exceptions
Lengthy and authoritative accounts of the origins of this doctrine
and the various exceptions to it which have developed over the
years are easily found elsewhere." A very brief account, placing
emphasis on exceptions to the general rule of particular relevance
to claims against public authorities, will be sufficient for present
purposes.
It is well known that the doctrine finds its origin in two leading,
if somewhat slender, nineteenth-century cases, Bilbie v. Lumley,
decided in i8o 2, 1" and Kelly v. Solari, decided in 1841." The former is the principal authority in the sense that it is the leading
decision refusing recovery of moneys paid under a mistake of law.
(1982) 132 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 193, aff'g (ig8o) 107 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (ONT.
C.A.), aff'g (1978) 92 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 481 (ONT. H.O.).
11 The standard texts on contract and restitutiton contain such discussions, as
do the many law review articles dealing with this subject. See supra, note 5.
2 (1802) 2 EAST 469, 102 E.R. 448.
20

13

(1841)

9 M. & W. 54, 152

.R.

24.
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The latter, although it is a decision allowing recovery of moneys
paid under a mistake of fact, assumes importance inasmuch as it
explains (and narrowly distinguishes) Bilbie v. Lumley as a decision
resting on the presence of a mistake of law. A close examination of
these two authorities indicates that the inherently unsatisfactory
nature of the mistake of law doctrine was abundantly evident at
the time of its birth. In Bilbie v. Lumley, an underwriter sought
recovery of moneys paid in response to a claim by an assured, on
the basis that the money was paid under a mistake. The defendant
had not at the time of insuring the risk disclosed a material fact
relating to the time of sailing of a particular ship. It was established
in evidence that a letter containing the informatiton in question was
made available to the underwriter at a later point in time, prior to
the claim, and at trial, Rooke J. held that since the money had been
paid with full knowledge or the means of full knowledge of all the
circumstances, it could not be recovered. On the appeal, Lord
Ellenborough C.J. asked counsel for the plaintiff whether there
were previous authorities allowing relief in cases of mistake of law.
No answer being given, Lord Elenborough went on to deny recovery on the basis of the ignorantiajuris maxim. It is notorious, of
course, that there were a number of previous authorities allowing
recovery and that Lord Ellenborough's mistake of law doctrine is
therefore itself a product of a mistake of law. This is no doubt an
evergreen source of classroom whimsy. It is perhaps less well known,
however, that the facts of the later case of Kelly v. Solari, in which
the opposite result was achieved, are very similar to those of the
Bilbie case. In Kelly, the directors of an insurance company sought
recovery of moneys paid to a widow under a policy of insurance on
the life of the late husband. The deceased had mistakenly failed to
pay one of the quarterly premiums on the policy and it had therefore lapsed. This fact had been drawn to the attention of the
directors but was later forgotten when the widow claimed the
amount due to her under the policy. As good legal realists, we might
expect that the widow's position might be treated more solicitously
than that of the defendant in the Bilbie case. In fact, however,
recovery was allowed on the basis that the mistake here was factual
in nature.
In both cases the plaintiff insurer had made a payment on the
mistaken assumption that the policy in question was valid and binding. Although the nature of the error differed, it would be very
difficult indeed to offer a basis for the different results in the two
cases which would persuade a layman that a sound policy had been
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achieved in this context. Goff and Jones have explained Bilbie v.
Lumley as a case of voluntary submission to an honest claim. 4 It
is not at all obvious whether Kelly v. Solari should not be so considered as well. One might distinguish the two cases by suggesting
that the kind of error made in Bilbie related to a question which
should be raised by the insurer at the time of processing the claim
(and that the insurer therefore should be deemed to have taken the
risk of error on this point when making the payment), whereas the
error in Kelly was essentially clerical in nature (and therefore,
arguably, not the sort of error within the risk assumed when making
the payment). Whether or not one accepts this interpretation of
these authorities, however, it is interesting to note that at this very
early stage, the mistake of law doctrine's capacity for promoting very
dissimilar results in very similar cases was manifest.
Although there is apparently some disagreement among commentators with respect to the identity and scope of some of the
exceptions to the general rule denying recovery, there would be
broad consensus with respect to the following list. First, it is accepted that a mistake of foreign law is to be treated as a mistake of
fact." Second, moneys paid on the basis of a mistake of law by a
public authority are recoverable apparently on the theory that the
public purse should for some reason be afforded greater protection
than private purses." Similar payments made by an officer of a
court are also recoverable.' 7 Fourth, payments made to an officer
of the court under a mistake of law are recoverable.'" This rule was
applied in Ex parte James9 to allow recovery from a trustee in
bankruptcy. James L.J. secured immortality in that case by stating
that the courts "ought to set an example to the world by paying
[the money] to the person really entitled to it". "In my opinion",
24 Supra, note i, at 91.
25 E.g., Lazard Brothers and Company v. Midland Bank, Ltd. [1933] A.C.
289; Weir v. Lohr and Allstate Insurance Co. of Canada (1967) 62 W.W.R.
99 (MAN. Q.B.).
16 E.g., Auckland Harbour Board v. The King [1924] A.C. 318; His Majesty
The King v. Toronto Terminals Railways Co. [1948] Ex. C.R. 563. And
see generally, Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, REPORT ON THE
RECOVERY OF UNAUTHORIZED

DISBURSEMENTS

OF PUBLIC FUNDS

(1980).

'7 E.g., in Re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society [i935] IOH. 91,

at 93.
18 E.g., Ex Parte Simmonds In

Re Carnac (I885) I6 Q.B.D. 308 (C.A.).
London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Henderson and McWilliams et al.
(1915) 8 W.W.R. I26O (MAN. K.B.).
19 (1874) L.R. 9 CH. APP. 609.
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he said, "the Court of Bankruptcy ought to be as honest as other
people"." Whether this exception can be extended to require public
officials in general to behave similarly is a question to which we will
return. Parties can, of course, contract in such a way as to require
the repayment of future payments under agreements subsequently
found not to be legally required and this might be counted a fifth
exception.2 Sixth, recovery will be allowed in equity if the mistake
is induced by some form of wrongdoing such as fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of a payee.2" Seventh, questions as to
marital status appear to be treated as matters of fact 23 Eighth,
where moneys have been improperly paid out by an executor,
trustee or personal representative (for example, on the basis of a
misconstruction of a will), it is established that the persons who
should have received the money can bring a claim against those who
did in fact receive it. 4 Curiously, however, it remains in doubt
whether the executors, trustees or personal representatives could
themselves bring such a claim.2" Ninth, recovery of moneys paid
under a mistake of law is often provided for in some fashion by
statute. The Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report
on Benefits Conferred Under a Mistake of Law lists sixteen provisions of this kind drawn from the Statutes of British Columbia.u
A tenth, and perhaps more controversial, exception pertains to
matters of so-called "private rights" as opposed to matters of "general law". 7 Although the nature of this distinction is rather imprecise, it would appear that it could be construed to extend to
Id., at 614.
See Sebel Products Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1949]
CH.409, ['949] 1 ALL E.R. 729.
22 See Rogers v. Ingham (0876) 3 CH. D. 351 per James L.J.; Harse v. Pearl
Life Assurance Co. [1904] 1 K.B. 558 per Romer L.J.
23 See Eaglesfield v.Marquis of Londonderry (1876) 4 CH. D. 693 at 702-03
per Jessel M.R.; Thompson v. Crawford (falsely called Thompson) [1932]
4 D.L.R. 206 (ONT. C.A.).
24 Re Diplock [1947] CH. 76, aff'd sub nom. Ministry of Health v. Simpson
[195t] A.C. 251.
25 It is established that overpayments may be set off against future payments.
See Dibbs v. Goren (849) 11 BEAv. 483; Re Musgrave [j916] 2 CH. 427.
Nonetheless, it was suggested in Re Diplock by Wynn-Parry J. that it is
assumed that such claim would fail because of the mistake of law doctrine.
See Re Diplock, id., at 725-26.
26 Supra, note 4, at 95-102. See also the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72,
c. 63, s. 164().
27 E.g., Cooper v. Phibbs (x867) L.R. 2 H.L. 149; Solle v. Butcher [1950] 1
K.B. 671 (C.A.).
20
21
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most questions of law pertaining to the mutual rights and obligations of private individuals. Misconstruction of a deed would clearly
be covered by this exception, for example. 8 The doctrine that relief
would be afforded in cases of mistakes relating to "private rights"
is, however, to be found in nineteenth-century English equity decisions and it therefore remains controversial whether the doctrine
would be extended to common law claims for the return of moneys
paid. Certainly, no less an authority than Winfield -' was of the
view that the distinction between private rights and general law
was applicable at common law as well, and there would appear to
be no reason in principle to argue that relief in equity for such
errors would be appropriate whereas it would not be at common
law. Thus, it may be that courts will be prepared to allow recovery
of moneys paid pursuant to mistakes as to private rights.30 An
exception of this kind would, of course, apply quite neatly to the
facts of Bilbie v. Lumley itself and, more generally, would substantially undermine the earlier case law denying recovery in similar situations.
The foregoing exceptions provide ample scope for confining the
impact of the general rule, but they appear to leave untouched the
situation of particular interest here, the exaction of excessive taxes
or other charges by a public authority acting outside the scope of its
statutory powers. Many of the foregoing exceptions would, of
course, be applicable in fact situations involving public authorities,
but none of them directly address this particular problem. There
are, however, further exceptions or lines of analysis which afford
relief in such cases and it is of particular interest that the Supreme
Court of Canada has taken a leading role in articulating and
expanding such exceptions.
Some of the exceptions listed above adopt the format of characterizing the particular error in question, for example, an error related
to ownership rights, as a matter of fact rather than law. Surely the
most remarkable use of this form of sophistry is to be found in the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in George (Porky) Jacobs
2 Earl of Beauchamp v. Winn (s873)

L.R. 6 H.L. 223.

29 P. H. Winfield, Mistake of Law (x943) 59 L.Q. REv. 327, at 339.
30 It is of no little interest that mistakes as to "private rights" are listed by
Dickson J. in his dissenting opinion in Nepean as one of the exceptions to
the rule "barring recovery of money paid under mistake of law" (suggesting
thereby that recovery, i.e., common law relief, should be allowed). See supra,
note 1o, at 207-o8.
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Enterprises Ltd. v. City of Regina,3 a case which involved the
overpayment by a wrestling promoter of municipal licensing fees.
The plaintiff and the municipality had both assumed that the bylaw under which the fees were exacted stipulated, as had previous
by-laws on the subject, for a "per day" fee. In reality, the by-law
merely required payment of the fee on an annual basis. The plaintiff was allowed to recover overpayments on the basis that his
mistake was really one of fact not law. He was said to have been
mistaken with respect to the existence of a by-law calling for a
license fee on a per day basis. Many errors of law could be converted into factual errors on this basis. In the case of ultra vires
legislation, for example, could one not argue that the legislation
was a nullity and therefore did not, in fact, exist? Where the problem is one of misconstruction of a statute it would be difficult,
presumably, for someone who has taken the trouble to examine the
law in question and has unfortunately misconstrued it, to rely on
the Jacobs analysis. In such a case, one might be able to say that the
misconstruer had believed in the existence of a law requiring the
payment in question, though in such circumstances the illogic of
the analysis is much more visible. Whatever the outer limits of this
proposition, mistakes as to the existence of a law must count as an
eleventh exception.
A twelfth exception of particular relevance in the context of
claims against public authorities has been drawn, in a somewhat
surprising way, from the law of illegal contracts and, in particular,
from the decision of the Privy Council in Kiriri Cotton Co. Ltd. v.
Dewani." In that case, a prospective tenant agreed to pay and did
pay a premium to his prospective landlord. Such payments were
prohibited by a rent restriction ordinance then in force and the
question which arose was whether the tenant could recover the
payment. It may be noted that if the landlord was allowed to retain
such payments, the underlying policy of the ordinance would be
significantly undermined. Counsel for the landlord astutely argued,
no doubt well aware of the capacity of the mistake of law doctrine
for bewitching judicial minds, that the tenant must have paid the
money under a mistake of law and therefore could not seek recovery. Lord Denning, noting that the obvious purpose of the
ordinance was the protection of the tenant, held that the landlord
must take primary responsibility for non-compliance with the ordi31 [x964] S.C.R. 326, 44 D.L.R. (2d) x79.
32 [x96o] A.C. 192, [196o] i ALL E.R. 177.
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nance and that the parties were therefore not equally at fault, that is,
not in pari delicto and that the landlord must return the premium.
One might restate the holding of the case as follows: where a transaction is rendered illegal by a law designed to protect the position
of the individual making a payment under the agreement, the
payment is recoverable. Although Kiriri Cotton is now considered
the leading authority on this subject, recovery on this basis has been
allowed since the time of Lord Mansfield. 3 In rejecting the submissions made on behalf of the defendant on the basis of the mistake
of law doctrine, Lord Denning commented:
It is not correct to say that everyone is presumed to know the law.
The true proposition is that no man can excuse himself from doing
his duty by saying that he did not know the law on the matter.
Ignorantia juris neminem excusat. Nor is it correct to say that money
paid under a mistake of law can never be recovered back. The true
proposition is that money paid under a mistake
of law, by itself and
34
without more, cannot be recovered back.
The "something more" in Kiriri, of course, was that the plaintiff
was not in pari delicto with the defendant as a result of the fact that
the statute rendering the transaction illegal was designed to protect
people in the plaintiff's position.
In recent Canadian case law, Lord Denning's rather opaque
statement concerning the general nature of the mistake of law
doctrine has been taken to be a leading pronouncement on the
doctrine and the in pari delicto rule has been wrenched out of its
illegal contract context and fashioned into an important exception
to the general mistake of law rule. The principal authority is the
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in William Eadie v. The
5
Corporationof the Township of Brantford."
In that case, an owner
of land who sought severance of the parcel was required by the
municipality to pay a severance fee and convey a strip of land to the
municipality. Although the owner originally refused to subject himself to these conditions, ultimately, for what might be described as
compassionate reasons, he decided that he wished to go forward
with the severance and so notified the municipality, agreeing to
meet the conditions imposed. The by-law under which the payment
33

34
31

See Smith v. Bromley (76o)

2 DOUG. K.B. 696 n; Clarke v. Shee and John-

son (1774) 1 CowP. 197, 2 DOUG. 698.
Supra, note 32, at 204 (A.C.), x8S (ALL E.R.).
[1967] S.C.R. 573, 63 D.L.R. (2d) 561, for a discussion of which see B.
Crawford, Restitution: Mistake of Law and Practical Compulsion (1967)

17 U. oF T. L.J. 344.
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and transfer was required was subsequently challenged by another
landowner and held to be ultra vires. Eadie successfully sought recovery of the moneys paid and the land transferred. Spence J.,
writing for the majority of the Court, was prepared to allow relief
on the basis that the benefits had been extracted by compulsion, a
topic to which we will shortly turn, but that moreover, recovery
should be allowed because the landlord was not in pari delicto with
the municipality for the following reason:
In this case, the appellant, as a taxpayer and inhabitant of the
defendant corporation, was dealing with the Clerk-treasurer of the
corporation and that Clerk-treasurer was under a duty toward the
appellant and other taxpayers of the municipality. When that Clerktreasurer demands payment of a sum of money on the basis of an
illegal by-law despite the fact that he does not then know of its
illegality, he is not
in pari delicto to the taxpayer who is required
36
to pay that sum.
This extension of the "not in pari delicto" exception to public
officials could be viewed as an extension of the rule in Ex parte
James, concerning officers of the court, to public officials more
generally.3" Its justification would be that public authorities ought
to bear the primary responsibility for not exceeding their legal
capacity in extracting moneys and other benefits from the citizenry
and ought, therefore, to be obliged to restore benefits obtained
through an illegitimate exercise of their authority. Whatever the
merits of this position, it is again obvious that a broad application
of this line of analysis would permit recovery in many instances in
which recovery has traditionally been thought to have been precluded by the mistake of law rule.
Many writers would agree that there is a further exception to the
general rule in cases where the moneys in question have been paid
under duress. The duress analysis normally arises in the context of
moneys extracted by public authorities in situations where refusal to
pay will result in interference with the plaintiff's rights; for example, seizure of his goods. While the scope of this doctrine is
somewhat uncertain, the traditional position is that a mere threat
on the part of the recipient to litigate would not itself constitute
duress in the requisite sense. While this view may well rest on a
very unrealistic assessment of the significance for the average citizen
36

Id., at 583 (S.C.R.), 572 (D.L.R.).

37

The trial judge had cast the point in essentially these terms, and Spence J.
commented that there is "much to be said in support of such a view". See
id., at 581 (S.C.R.), at 570 (D.L.R.).
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of a threat of litigation by a public authority, it does suggest that
the underlying rationale of the rule is that in cases where litigation
of the dispute is a possibility, payment of the disputed amount
should normally be assumed to have been motivated by an intention
to settle the dispute. In this way, the duress rule does seem related
to what has been suggested above to be the underlying rationale
of the mistake of law rule, that is, that payments made ought normally to be considered to close the matter in dispute. The duress
exception does not accurately capture this rationale, however, as
there would be many cases in which duress is absent and payment is
nonetheless made without any intention of settling a dispute.
In the Eadie case, the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have
relaxed the duress requirement to some extent. Counsel for the
municipality argued that the plaintiff must establish that there was
no alternative other than payment available to him. It was the view
of Spence J., however, that the requirement is not this stringent and
that it would be sufficient to establish that the plaintiff was under
some practical compulsion to proceed. The plaintiff had in fact
wished to proceed with severance of the property in order to sell it
and establish his wife in more suitable circumstances. The plaintiff
was at the time hospitalized as a result of illness and it was impractical for him to litigate the matter. The payment could, therefore, be said to have been made under a form of "practical compulsion". The compulsion, we may note, results not from the
threatened action of the municipality but rather from the personal
circumstances of the plaintiff which made it desirable for him to
proceed with severance of the land and undesirable or impractical
to turn to litigation.
Again, this extension of prior law seems capable of rather broad
application. There will, after all, be many circumstances in which
it can fairly be said that litigation is not a practical alternative for
an individual engaged in dealings with a public authority. The
concept of practical compulsion is obviously an imprecise one, however, and the law reports suggest that the courts are having some
difficulty in discerning its outer reaches. For example, the provincial
courts of appeal of British Columbia and Ontario appear to differ
on the question of whether an individual wishing to proceed with a
development project for essentially commercial reasons can be said
to have acted under practical compulsion.3 8
as See Re Hay et al. and City of Burlington (198i) I3P D.L.R. ( 3 d) 6oo
(ONT. C.A.), and compare Gliduray Holdings Ltd. v. Village of Qualicum
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Parenthetically, it is of some interest that the status of the duress
cases as an exception to the general rule is a bit curious. One might
be forgiven for thinking that true cases of payment under a mistake
of law and payments made under duress would be mutually exclusive phenomena. Presumably, if one is mistaken about the law,
one pays because one believes one is obliged to do so by law. If one
is responding to duress, it must be that the individual believes or
strongly suspects that there is no legal requirement to pay.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Eadie, however, appears to
accept that the facts of that case represent both an instance of payment made under a mistake of law and of duress or practical compulsion; on the basis, presumably, that although Eadie mistakenly
assumed that he was obliged by law to make the payments upon
severance (and therefore suffered from a mistake of law), he proceeded to sever the land and make the payments only because he
was under practical compulsion to do so (and was therefore not
motivated simply by a mistaken belief as to the current state of the
law). But is this not, then, a rather odd case of duress? If Eadie
believed, as appears to be the case, that the by-law in question was
valid, we may assume that the thought of litigating this point did
not occur to him. It may be true that if he wanted to litigate he
would have determined that it was impractical to do so, but there is
no evidence that the thought of challenging the validity of the
by-law had ever occurred to him. When viewed from this perspective, it is not at all obvious that the plaintiff's circumstances in
Eadie are materially different from those of any other individual
who paid the severance fee under a mistake of law and the better
explanation for the result thus appears to be the "not in pari delicto"
rationale put forward in the alternative by Spence J. and discussed
briefly above.
Even without this Canadian gloss, the duress principle is, as
Beach (g8i)
129 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 599 (B.C.C.A.). In both cases improper
charges were levied by municipalities in the context of granting approval for
development projects. The Ontario Court allowed and the B.C. Court denied
relief. See also J.R.S. Holdings Ltd. et at. v. District of Maple Ridge (xg8x)
122 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 398 (B.C.S.C.) in which Berger J. refused, in similar circumstances, to hold that the payment had been made under compulsion but
was prepared to allow relief on the grounds that the parties were not in pari
delicto. Re G. Gordon Foster Developments Limited v. Township of Langley
(1979) 102 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 730 (B.C.C.A.), (similar circumstances but with
the difference that the developer at the time of deciding to comply with the
requirement to pay charges did not hold the land but held an option on it;
recovery denied).
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P. B. H. Birks has demonstrated," a most unsatisfactory device for
imposing liability on public authorities. First, the rule has undesirable consequences from the point of view of public policy. If a
threat of some sort is a necessary element in the cause of action,
individuals who cheerfully pay what they are told they must pay
by a public official will have no recourse. Only those less trusting
individuals who may have access to legal advice and who challenge
the authority will provoke the requisite threat. A rule which penalizes citizens who are inclined to assume that public authorities act
within the law does not accord with common sense. Second, to the
extent that the duress rule rests on the notion that the public authority has required payment for something to which the payer was
in reality entitled free of charge, the rule carries with it the anomaly
that if payment is made under a legislative scheme (say, a licensing
scheme) which is completely ultra vires, no recovery will be allowed
(because the payer was not entitled to a licence of any kind).40 The
more illegitimate the assertion of power, the less likely one is to
recover. Finally, a close examination of the English cases on duress
reveals that they can not all be explained as cases of threatened
withholding of entitlements but rather represent a broader phenomenon of permitting recovery of moneys extracted by the ultra
vires action of public authorities. It would be misleading to characterize them as requiring an element of compulsion.4 1
Whatever the true nature and current status of these apparent
exceptions to the general rule, it may fairly be said that the Supreme
Court of Canada indicates, in the Jacobs and Eadie decisions, that
it is prepared to be somewhat agile in its interpretation of the
traditional doctrines in order to visit liability on public authorities
acting in excess of their statutory mandate. There are two further
decisions of the Supreme Court consistent with this trend, the first
of which might be thought to establish an entirely new and very
important exception to the general rule concerning payments made
s9 P. B. H. Birks, Restitution From Public Authorities (398o) 33 Cum. L.
PROB. 191.
40 Id., at 196-98, noting that this implicatiton of the duress rule has surfaced
in the Australian case law. See Mason v. New South Wales (1959) 102
C.L.R. io8 (AUST. H.C.); Bell Bros. (Ply.) Ltd. v. Serpentine-Jarrahdale
Shire (x969-70) i21 C.L.R. 137 (AusT. H.C.).
41 The decision in Steele v. Williams (1853) 8 Ex. 625, 155 E.R. t5o2, is of
particular interest inasmuch as that case involved an improper imposition of
charges for the taking of extracts from a parish register, but the charges
were in fact imposed only after the extracts had been taken. There was thus
no threatened withholding of an entitlement at the time the payment was
made. See Birks, supra, note 39, at 200-01.
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under a mistake of law. In Amax Potash Ltd. et el. v. Government
of Saskatchewan4 2 the Court held that legislation denying taxpayers
recovery of taxes paid under ultra vires taxing legislation would
itself be ultra vires. The impugned provision was a section of the
Proceedings Against the Crown Act43 which purported to preclude
proceedings against the Crown with respect to anything done or
omitted in the exercise of a power or authority conferred by enactments which are beyond the legislative jurisdiction of the Legislature. Were it not for this provision, the facts of the Amax case were
such that recovery at common law on the basis of duress should
have been possible. However, the reasoning of the Court does not
suggest that the unconstitutionality of the provision relates only to
situations of this kind. 4 Rather, the conclusion of the Court is that
the provision in question was "ultra vires the Province of Saskatchewan in so far as it purports to bar the recovery of taxes paid under
a statute or statutory provision which is beyond the legislative jurisdiction of the Legislature of Saskatchewan".4 5
The Amax decision is of great interest to public lawyers inasmuch
as it suggests the existence of an inherent limitation on legislative
power deriving from the essential nature of federalism. The interest
of this holding in the present context, is that the recovery of payments made, say of taxes, under ultra vires legislation would generally be thought to be precluded by the mistake of law doctrine.
Yet, legislation which so prescribes, we are told in Amax, is itself
ultra vires. Surely, it must follow from this that a court could not
now at common law deny recovery on the basis of a principle which
would, if enacted by a legislature, be ultra vires. We should add to
42

[1977] 2 S.C.R. 576, (1976)

43

R.S.S. 1965, C. 87, s. 5(7).
The point of constitutional law established in Amax is sufficiently novel that
some caution should be expressed with respect to opinions such as that stated
in the text. Nonetheless, it would be surprising if the Court were ultimately
to attempt to restrict the Araax principle either to legislation which permits
recovery where public officials have exercised duress, or to situations in
which the legislature has evidently attempted to do indirectly what it
can not do directly; that is to say that it has wilfully enacted legislation for
the purpose of retaining moneys which it knows it has collected or will
collect under specific legislation which it knows to be ultra vires. With respect to the former suggestion, the idea of placing a limit on the exercise
of legislative power that traces along the path of the rationale in the Eadie

44

45

71 D.L.R. (3d) x.

case would be to introduce a constitutional doctrine of unattractive subtlety
and uncertainty. With respect to the latter suggestion, a constitutional doctrine which limited capacity on the basis of the "state of mind" of the legislature would have obvious flaws, not the least of which would centre on
problems of proof.
Supra, note 42, at 594 (S.C.R.), 13 (D.L.R.).
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our list, then, a fourteenth exception to the general effect that
moneys paid to the federal or a provincial government under a
mistaken assumption as to the constitutional validity of the legislation requiring the payment are recoverable.
Finally, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kew
Property Planning & Management Ltd. v. Town of Burlington"
might be taken as some evidence, albeit rather indirect, of support
for the view that municipalities ought not to be permitted to retain
tax revenues exacted in excess of those permitted by their statutory
taxing powers. The facts of this case were most unusual in nature,
involving the subsequent retroactive repeal of the provision under
which the taxpayer's liability was initially determined. Estey J.,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that the moneys paid under
what appeared to be perfectly valid legislation at the time of payment could be recovered on the basis that the retroactive repeal of
the legislation by the province meant that the municipality "had
no right to make the additional assessment nor to collect any taxes
based on such additional assessment, and the respondent can demonstrate no right by which it can now retain the moneys thus
7 This is a very different fact situation
obtained from the appellant"Y.
from that in which the municipality acts in excess of its existing
statutory powers, but it is not at all clear that it would be consistent to allow recovery in the Kew Property case and not in the
context of other situations in which a municipality collects taxes
without having any statutory authority to do so. If, as in Kew
Property, a municipality cannot retain taxes collected under legislation which was at the time of collection valid, a fortiori, it may
be argued, a municipality ought not to be able to retain taxes
collected without any statutory authority whatsoever. There is, however, earlier authority which suggests that municipalities can retain
taxes or other charges paid in just such circumstances" and it would
be rather too much of a jurisprudential leap to suggest that they
have been indirectly overruled by the decision in Kew Property.
The result in Kew Property might be explained on the basis that
civil relief is tacitly mandated by the retroactive nature of the
statute. Perhaps it is not too much to suggest, however, that Kew
46 (1980)

11o D.L.R. ( 3 d) 263.

47 Id., at 275.
48 See Colwood Park Association Limited v. Corporation of the District of Oak
Bay [1928] 3 D.L.R. 812, [1928] 2 W.W.R. 593 (B.C.S.C.); and the B.C.
cases referred to supra, note 38.
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Property,when read together with Amax Potash Ltd., does suggest
that the earlier authorities may require future reconsideration.
This brief review of the exceptions to the general rule concerning
payments made under a mistake of law suggests two conclusions.
First, the substantial length of the list of recognized exceptions and
the evidence of its continuing growth offer support for the view
that the general rule is gradually being overwhelmed by its exceptions. Second, in the case of public authorities, the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada strongly suggest that the distinction
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law is being significantly
eroded and, were it not for the decision in the Nepean case, one
might have speculated that the distinction would soon be simply
jettisoned. Before turning to consider the problematic aspects of a
general rule imposing liability on public authorities, it will be useful
to briefly consider recent developments in mistake of fact doctrine.
The argument for collapsing the distinction would be significantly
undermined if the current state of mistake of fact doctrine was
itself unsatisfactory.
Recovery of Moneys Paid Under a Mistake of Fact:
Recent Developments
Although it is generally understood that moneys paid under a
mistake of fact are recoverable, the precise nature of the elements
of the cause of action have been a matter of dispute over the years
and have only quite recently, it will be suggested here, been subjected to a rational restatement by English and Canadian courts.
This point is worthy of more extended statement and defence than
it will be given here.4" However, it will be useful to suggest the main
lines of argument as a prelude to considering the desirability of
abolishing the distinction between mistakes of fact and those of law.
The rules relating to the recovery of moneys paid under a mistake
of fact illustrate the disconnection between rules, and underlying
reasons, prevalent in the mistake of law context. Thus, although
critics would no doubt for the most part agree with the results of
decided cases, there would often be a dissonance between the reasoning of the court and what seems to be the reason underlying the
decision to grant or deny relief. The recent restatement of the rules
elevates the underlying reasons to a status of articulated rules governing liability. To illustrate this point, it will be useful to compare
49

For a useful discussion see C. A. Needham, Mistaken Payments: A New Look
at an Old Theme (1978) 12 U.B.C. L. REV. 159.
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one of the classic Canadian statements of the general rule with two
modem authorities which, when considered together, effect a systematic restatement of the old rule.
In Royal Bank v. The King,50 Dysart J. suggested that recovery
would be allowed where the following four conditions were met.
First: that the mistake is honest.... The second condition is that the
mistake must be as between the person paying and the person receiving the money.... The third condition is that the facts, as they are
believed to be, impose an obligation to make the payment.... This
obligation must be legal or equitable or moral.... The fourth condition to recovery is that the receiver of the money has no legal
or equitable or moral right to retain the money as against the
payer....52
The general thrust of the criticism of the old formulation of the rule
is that requirements such as the second, that the mistake must be
"as between" the parties, do not accurately state the reasons for
denying relief. Demonstrably, this particular condition is not a genuine requirement of relief. There are decisions of high authority in
which the requirement is ignored. 2 In the Royal Bank case, in order
to ensure that the mistake was as between the parties, the Court
held, somewhat artificially, that the individual inducing the mistaken payment was an agent of one of the parties.5 Similar criticisms have been made of the third condition: relief has been
5
awarded in the absence of errors of this kind.
The principal reasons for denying relief, visible beneath the doctrinal orthodoxy of the old rule, were that the payer had assumed
the risk of his error (the finality of dispute resolution rationale,
discussed above) or that the recipient of the payment had, in reliance on the receipt of the payment, changed his position to his
5( [193x 2 D.L.R. 685 (MAN. K.B.).
51 Id., at 688-89.
52

See Colonial Bank v. Exchange Bank of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia [1885] 11
APP. CAs. 84 (P.C.); ImperialBank of Canada v. Bank of Hamilton [1903]
A.C. 49 (P.C.). Nonetheless, the notion still surfaces in the reported case
law, e.g., Royal Bank of Canada v. Boyce (z966) 57 D.L.R. (2d) 683 (ONT.

Co. CT.).
53

54

The Court held that the actions of the defendant in receiving and retaining
the moneys paid under a mistake amounted to a ratification of the actions
of the individual who induced the plaintiff to make the payments, thus rendering him their agent and establishing privity to the mistake. On the basis

of this line of analysis, of course, the mistake will always be between the
parties inasmuch as a receipt in retention of the moneys will establish an
agency relationship which will necessarily make this so.
See supra, note 49, at x67-70.
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detriment so that it is unfair to require repayment. The essentials
of a modem restatement of the rule would, it has been argued, hold
that where moneys have been paid under a mistake of fact, providing that the payment was caused by the error in question, recovery
will be allowed unless the payer must be taken to have assumed the
risk of error or the defendant has detrimentally changed his position
in reliance on the receipt." This version of the mistake of fact rule
is essentially that found in the American rcstitutionary law" and it
has been thought that the Supreme Court of Canada's embrace of
the American unjust enrichment analysis of restitutionary problems"
might facilitate a modem restatement along these lines in the
Canadian context.
Until quite recently, two major stumbling blocks
stood in the
path of a judicial restatement of this kind. First, English and Canadian courts had not yet accepted the validity of a change of position
defence per se. The defence of estoppel by representation responds
to similar concerns relating to detrimental reliance but English
courts were unwilling to conclude that the mere making of a payment under a mistake of fact amounted to a representation that the
moneys were owed, and accordingly an estoppel would not be raised
in cases where a mere payment without an accompanying representation was followed by a change of position. 8 Second, even if a
change of position defence were recognized, it would not necessarily
be the case that the courts would agree that the old conditions
could be swept away and replaced by a more simplified rule containing as one of its constituent elements a change of position
defence.
The first obstacle has been eliminated, for Canadian purposes at
least, by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rural
Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd.59 in which
the Court recognized the existence of a change of position defence
of the American variety in Canadian law. It is of particular interest
55 See id.; and supra, note I, at 69-89.
56 See American Law Institute RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937), St. Paul,
ss. 15-28 and 69; G. E. Palmer, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, VOL. III
(1978), Boston. 141-55.
57 See DegIman v. Guaranty Trust Co. [1954] S.C.R. 725, [I954] 3 D.L.R.
785; County of Carleton v. City of Ottawa [x965] S.C.R. 663, 52 D.L.R.
(2d) 220.
58 See Jones, Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd. [i926] A.C. 670 (H.L.). And see
P. B. H. Birks, The Recovery of Carelessly Mistaken Payments (1972) 25
CURR. L. PROB. 179;
A. Needham, supra, note 49, at 58o-9o.

a.

59 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 147, (1975 )55 D.L.R. (3d) I.
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that Martland J., writing for the Court, noted that the unjust
enrichment principle has been accepted as a basis for claims of this
kind in Canadian law and that in this respect Canadian law would
appear to differ from English law. The change of position defence
was not, however, available on the facts of the Storthoaks case. The
plaintiff oil company, having surrendered certain oil leases, mistakenly continued to pay royalties with respect to them to the
defendant municipality. The attempt of the municipality to rely on
the change of position defence was unsuccessful, as it was unable
to show that it had acted to its prejudice in reliance on the receipt
of these payments. Martland J. noted that there was:
no evidence of any special projects being undertaken or special
financial commitments made because of the receipt of these payments, nor that the Municipality altered its position in any way
because these moneys were received. The mere fact that the moneys
were spent does not, by itself, furnish an answer to the claim for
repayment. 60
As thus conceived, the defence is a rather stringent one in that it
requires a demonstration of a clear connection between receipt of
the overpayment and the taking of the new initiative. It may well
be that the defence would receive a broader interpretation in a
context other than the expenditure of funds by public authorities.
The second obstacle to the modernization of the rule -possible
judicial reticence to engage in the project of restating the rule may be taken to have been removed by the judgment of Goff J.,
as he then was, in BarclaysBank Ltd. v. W. J. Simms Son & Cooke
(Southern) Ltd.6 In determining whether a bank could recover
moneys mistakenly paid over a stop payment order, Goff J. engaged
in a lengthy and masterly reconsideration of the prior English case
law on the general question of the recovery of moneys paid under a
mistake of fact and demonstrated that they can best be reconciled
along the lines of what has been described above as the modem
restatement of the rule. To the extent that English law does not yet
clearly accept the existence of a change of position defence and does
not appear to accept the unjust enrichment analysis of restitutionary
claims, it may well be that the Barclays Bank analysis is vulnerable
to attack in subsequent English case law. On the other hand, the
existence of the Storthoaks authority should mean that Goff J.'s
analysis would be hospitably received and considered to be a valu60 Id., at 164 (S.C.R.), 13 (D.L.R.).
6 [19791 3 ALL E.R. 522 (Q.B.).
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able restatement of the rule for the purposes of Canadian law on
this subject.
Prior to these recent developments, one might well have argued
that to relegate mistake of law problems to the mistake of fact rules
would simply be to withdraw them from the frying pan in order
to place them in the fire. If, however, we may assume that the
mistake of fact rules have been or will shortly be subjected to a
sensible restatement, a collapse of the distinction between mistakes
of law and mistakes of fact could not be objected to on this basis.
It remains to consider whether the more particular problem of
imposing restitutionary liability on public authorities gives rise to
special considerations which may not be adequately accommodated
by the modem rule permitting recovery of moneys paid under a
mistake of fact.
The Imposition of Restitutionary Liability on Public Authorities:
Special Considerations
Moneys might be paid to a public authority as a result of any one
of a broad range of different kinds of legal errors. The reported
case law suggests, as one would expect, that such payments normally
arise in circumstances where the public authority is itself labouring
under the same mistake. Often, of course, representations made on
behalf of the authority will have been the source of the payer's
confusion. Payments may be required under federal or provincial
legislation which is ultimately determined to be ultra vires or under
regulations which may be determined to be beyond the regulationmaking power conferred by statute. Subordinate bodies, such as
municipalities, may require the payment of money in an illegitimate
exercise of their rule-making powers. Indeed, ultra vires municipal
by-laws appear to be a particularly fertile source of litigation. Public
officials at any level may insist on the payment of moneys on the
basis of an erroneous interpretation of the legislative mandate.
Abolition of the distinction between mistakes of law and those of
fact would mean that in all of these situations, restitutionary liability
would normally be imposed in the absence of some defence.
A number of arguments in favour of relief in these circumstances
can be made. In general terms, the policy of the common law of
preventing unjust enrichment weighs heavily in favour of relief. The
recipient will have secured, in an unauthorized or illegitimate way,
a benefit at the expense of the person making the payment. Further,
it may be argued that the courts have already recognized the force
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of the unjust enrichment policy in this context inasmuch as relief is
readily allowed where the mistake is one of fact as in the Storthoaks
case, or where the circumstances can be said to fit within one of the
many exceptions to the mistake of law rule. To eliminate the last
vestiges of the general rule would result in a more elegant doctrine
and would conduce to more consistent results in the decided cases.
The most important of the existing exceptions is arguably that of
duress. It has been suggested above that to premise relief on this
basis is to reward fractious and/or well-advised members of the
community and to punish those who are law-abiding, unsuspicious
of public authority or without the means or inclination to seek legal
advice. Quite apart from these concerns, the duress exception is
itself plagued with uncertainty and points of difficulty which render
it an unsatisfactory device for granting relief. Abandonment of the
invidious and unsound distinctions of the duress case law would be
a very desirable consequence of the adoption of a general rule
favouring relief.
Some observers might find arguments based on constitutional
considerations even more persuasive. P. B. H. Birks has argued 2
that relief ought to be allowed as a general matter on the basis of
the fundamental principle that there must be no taxation without
the consent of Parliament, a principle enshrined in the Bill of Rights
of 16883 and of no little importance in our constitutional history.
Public officials acting outside the ambit of a statutory authority are
taxing without the consent of the governed, expressed through their
legislature. It would, it is suggested, be inconsistent with fundamental principle to allow retention of tax revenues acquired in this
fashion. Do we not find a rather similar theoretical premise underlying the judgment of the Supreme Court in Amax? It appears to
be the view of the Court that legislatures in the federal system do
not have the legislative power to legislate in such fashion as to
retain tax revenues levied from the public on the basis of ultra vires
tax measures. It appears to be Dickson J.'s point that it would be
inconsistent with the federal system of government to permit one
level of government to retain moneys gathered in this fashion;
although it is not clear that the underlying premise is the concern
that to hold otherwise would enable one level of government to
trench on the taxing powers of another, or rather the concern raised
by Birks that in so acting the government is acting beyond the scope
62 Supra, note 39.
63 1 W. & M. Sess. 2, C. 2.
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of its democratic mandate and ought to be required to disgorge the
ill-gotten gains.
This appeal to basic democratic values may well underlie the
inclination of the Supreme Court of Canada in the decisions previously discussed to impose restitutionary liability on public authorities acting in excess of their authority. This inclination is evident not
only in the context of ultra vires legislation but in the context of
invalid rule-making of subordinate bodies in Eadie, and the misinterpretatiton of a valid law in Jacobs. Thus, it would appear to be
a broadly conceived concern, of the kind raised by P. B. H. Birks,
rather than a narrow concern relating to the distribution of legislative power in a federal system. To the extent that one accepts
these broader concerns as legitimate a strong case is made for imposing restitutionary liability on public authorities more readily than
on private citizens, and this is consistent with the line of reasoning
advanced by Spence J. in Eadie with respect to the extension of the
"not in pari delicto" exception to public officials generally. 4
If there are persuasive reasons favouring relief, there are also reasons to hesitate before adopting a general rule imposing liability in
these cases. One would wish to be confident that these concerns are
accommodated in any new rule and it may well be that hesitation
on this point has led judges over the years, and the majority of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Nepean in particular, to resist outright
rejection of the mistake of law rule.
First of all, there may be some concern that a general rule allowing recovery could result in fiscal chaos where a long-standing taxation practice is established to be misconceived for some reason or
other. While it might be thought to be appropriate to allow recovery
where the problem is relatively idiosyncratic in nature, such as an
interpretation of a taxing provision applicable to a reasonably small
subset of the population, an attack on the entire basis of a scheme
under which enormous revenues may have been gathered might
place the public treasury in some difficulty or, at the very least,
create tax burdens for the current generation of taxpayers which
some might think to be unreasonable. It is this concern with the
possibility of disruption of fiscal affairs that explains, in Palmer's
4

f. B. McKenna, Mistake of Law Between Statutory Bodies and Private
Citizens: An Examination of the Rationale for Recovery of Money Paid
(1979) 37 U. OF T. FAC. L. REv. 223 in which it is argued that the Kiriri
and Eadie cases can be read in support of the proposition that public
authorities are under a duty to observe the law for the protection of citizens
and must therefore accept responsibility when it has misled a citizen with
respect to the legality of a demand for payment.
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view, 5 the fact that American courts have been reluctant to allow
recovery of moneys paid under invalid statutes but willing to accord
relief where the problem involves essentially an overassessment
under a valid tax statute. There is some irony, therefore, in the fact
that the holding in the Amax case appears to entail the proposition
that moneys paid under ultra vires schemes of this sort are indeed
recoverable. The facts of the Amax case do provide a basis for
suggesting, however, that the bright line test based on vires which
is evidenced in the American experience is an inappropriate basis
for identifying situations in which relief should be denied. The
legislation impugned in the Amax case did in fact apply only to
members of a particular industry, and it would be a very harsh
result indeed to deny relief to a small group of participants in that
industry simply because the consequences of an ultra vires holding
in other contexts might result in serious disruption to the treasury.
The concern with respect to fiscal disruption may be found by
some to be sufficiently troublesome to justify retention of the mistake
of law rule. This would, in my view, give too much effect to what
is after all a remote possibility. As the reported cases indicate, recovery can normally be allowed without any significant disruption
of public finances; and if the fair result as a general matter is to
award recovery, the fact that it might be very difficult to do so in
an extremely unusual case suggests that recovery ought to be allowed
as a general rule. An exception to the general rule should be
tailored to meet the very unusual case. A preferable approach is to
hold that recovery is normally allowed except where it can not be
achieved without major disruption of the financial affairs of the
level of government or public authority involved. It would be helpful, I would suggest, in identifying such cases if the source of the
public treasury, the taxpayer, be kept in mind as the ultimate bearer
of any liability to be imposed. In weighing the unfairness of denying
relief to those who have overpaid in the past against the unfairness
of fixing this burden on the current generation of taxpayers, it may
be possible to identify situations in which the granting of relief
would create an injustice for the latter group and ought therefore
to be denied. It will ultimately be suggested here that the facts of
the Nepean case may represent a situation of this kind and that this
possibility is not sufficiently acknowledged in the dissenting opinion
of Dickson J., which favoured the granting of relief.
65 Palmer, supra, note 56, at 246-58.
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When considered against this background, the common sense
underlying the duress line of analysis emerges. In the traditional
duress context, where protest was present, the government would
be on notice that the legality of the requirement to pay was under
challenge and could conduct its fiscal affairs accordingly. My own
view, however, is that this is not in itself sufficient basis for limiting
recovery to the duress context. In the duress cases themselves, as the
Eadie case demonstrates, the requirement of protest has disappeared.
Moreover, recovery is frequently allowed in the context of the other
exceptions to the mistake of law rule without any notice whatsoever
and, of course, in the context of payments made under a mistake of
fact as well. It is not the case under present law, then, that recovery
is allowed only in cases where the public authority in question is
aware of the potential difficulty. This, together with the deficiencies
of the duress analysis outlined above, suggests that it is an inadequate basis for resolving disputes of this kind.
Before leaving this point, it is important to note that the change
of position defence established by the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Storthoaks case would not, as it is there interpreted, solve this
problem. It was Martland J.'s view that a change of position would
not be established simply by demonstrating that the revenues collected had been dispersed by the defendant municipality. To raise
the defence, it was thought to be necessary that some new initiative
made in reliance on the existence of the additional revenues be
shown to have been undertaken. Thus, a defence based on the
concern for fiscal disruption would, for doctrinal purposes, have to
be included simply as an addition to the traditional list of reasons
why it is "inequitable" to award recovery. This is not to suggest,
however, that relief should have been denied in Storthoaks on this
basis. There did not appear to be any evidence that serious fiscal
disruption would result in that case.
Other problems are revealed if one attempts to determine in any
particular context who the ultimate beneficiaries of the original
overpayment were, and who the ultimate bearers of the cost of any
liability imposed will be. If, for example, the original overpayment
was made by a commercial party who simply passed the cost thereof
on to his consumers, might it not be argued that recovery should be
denied on the ground that the plaintiff can not establish that the
benefit was conferred on the state at the plaintiff's expense?" Similarly, if it were established that the funds yielded by the illegitimate
6 Such arguments have prevailed in some American case law. See id., at 251-52.
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levy were spent by the public authority in such a way as to increase
the value of the payer's assets (for example, by improving his land)
might it not be thought that this is again a case in which the state
has not been enriched at the payer's expense? 7 In short, an attempt
to identify the ultimate winners and losers in a chain of events of
this kind may suggest that there are reasons why it would be inequitable to grant relief which are quite peculiar to the context of
unauthorized revenue collection by public authorities.
Interesting problems of a similar nature would arise in cases
where the public authority had chosen the wrong instrument to
collect the revenues, in the sense that it could have achieved the
original legislative objective through lawful means. Thus, there
could arise the situation in which a statutory levy, say on a resource
industry, which has been impugned as ultra vires might have been
collected through valid contractual agreements requiring royalty
payments. If it could be demonstrated that such arrangements
would have been agreed to in the first instance, and that it is now
too late to revive them, it might be thought to be inequitable to
allow recovery."s
A number of these kinds of situations which may give concern to
adherents of the traditional mistake of law doctrine may, of course,
be quite adequately resolved by the existing mistake of fact rules.
Thus, the change of position defence recognized in Storthoakswould
resolve problems of detrimental reliance of a relatively straightforward kind. Further, any concern there might be that the finality
of compromises might be threatened would be misconceived inasmuch as this is also a problem which must be and is accommodated
in the mistake of fact context.
An additional concern weighing against a general rule awarding
recovery might be that the prospect of such relief might encourage
public officials to take an unduly cautious view of their statutory
powers. Although this would be consistent with the general principle
favouring narrow construction of taxing provisions and might, more
generally, be welcomed by many as a positive social good, it may
be thought by others that a rule which conduced conservative
67
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Recovery was denied on this basis in A. J. Seversen Inc. v. Village of Qualicum Beach (1982) 135 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 122 (B.O.C.A.).
There may, of course, be situations in which the possibility of intra vires
legislation having retroactive effect would undermine the basis of this defence. See, for example, Canadian Industry Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Government
of Saskatchewan [1978] 2 S.C.R. 548, 8o D.L.R. (3d) 449, and its aftermath,
described in W. D. Moull, Natural Resources: The Other Crisis in Canadian
Federalism (198o) x8 OSGOODE HALL L.J. z, at 25-27.
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interpretation of statutory mandates conferred by legislatures would
be inconsistent with the legislative intent in many statutory contexts.
It would not be sensible, in my view, to place much emphasis on this
sort of consideration. There are other pressures present in the political system which are likely to be more influential than the law of
restitution in determining the degree of caution or abandon exhibited by public officials in the discharge of their responsibilities.
It seems more appropriate, therefore, to consider the possibility of
undue caution a potential cost of a rule allowing recovery rather
than a reason for not adopting this approach.
There are, then, relevant considerations which are peculiar to the
context of restitutionary claims against public authorities. A number
of these considerations weigh in favour of the granting of recovery
and appear to add force to the argument that the distinction between mistakes of fact and of law in this context should be abandoned. There also appear, however, to be a number of problems
specific to this context which suggest that there may be reasons for
denying relief and which may not be easily captured by the change
of position defence. The solution proposed here is simply to accept
that these peculiar situations be recognized as such and considered
as the foundation for a holding that the grant of recovery would be
inequitable in the circumstances of the particular case.
Hydro Electric Commission of the Township of Nepean
v. Ontario Hydro
The fact situation giving rise to the Nepean litigation6 9 provided
an interesting context within which to consider the general question
of the continuing vitality of the mistake of law doctrine and the
particular problem of the imposition of restitutionary liability on
public authorities. The claim arose as a result of a scheme developed
by Ontario Hydro for charging municipalities for the cost of electric
power which it supplied to them. In simple terms, the charges reflected both a capital cost element and an element reflecting other
costs involved in the supply of power. The billing practice which
proved to be contentious was Hydro's scheme, revised from time to
time over the years, which required newer municipalities to contribute more heavily to the capital cost of the hydro system than
older municipalities. Older municipalities were credited with a socalled "return on equity" which had the effect of reducing the
69
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amount charged by Hydro for power supplied, whereas the newer
municipalities were charged an offsetting "cost of return" on equity.
The underlying premise of this scheme was that the older municipalities had over the years made a substantial contribution to the
capital cost of the system and therefore ought not to be required to
contribute on an equal basis with newer municipalities to the capital
investment required for expansion of the system.
In this litigation, the Township of Nepean successfully challenged
the legal basis for the version of this scheme which had been in
effect from i966 to the time of the commencement of the action.
Although Nepean had vigorously protested the nature of the scheme
during the period from 1966 to 1973, it was not until 1974 that it
came to the conclusion that the charges assessed for "cost of return" had no legal basis in the enabling legislation of Ontario
Hydro. At that time, Nepean discontinued making these annual
payments. The trial judge and unanimous appeal courts at both
levels agreed in holding that Hydro's statutory right to pass on the
"costs" of supplying power to its customers did not extend to the
imposition of levies of this kind on the newer municipalities. The
relief sought by Nepean was the return of some $921,463.00 of such
charges paid from 1966 to 1973. Hydro counterclaimed for charges
of this kind allegedly owing for the period from 1974 to 1978.

At trial, Craig J. dismissed both the claim and the counterclaim
and this result was upheld in both the Ontario Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court of Canada. Having determined that Ontario Hydro had no authority to structure its billings in this fashion,
Craig J. went on to consider the merits of the plaintiff's claim for
return of the money already paid on the basis of the propositions
advanced by the Supreme Court in the Eadie case. The plaintiff
argued that it ought to succeed either on the basis that the payments had been made under a practical compulsion or on the basis
that the plaintiff was not in pari delicto with the defendant. With
respect to the compulsion point, it was Craig J.'s view that compulsion had not been established on the facts. Although a Hydro
official had suggested in conversation with a representative of the
plaintiff that if the latter refused to make payments Hydro would
"put the trustees in," it was apparently Craig J.'s view that this
was not a serious threat and that it was therefore not a situation in
which payment had been made to avoid a "threatened evil"." The
payment was a voluntary payment made under a mistake of law.
7'

(1978)

92

D.L.R. ( 3 d) 481, at 499-500.
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Turning then to the in pani delicto analysis, Craig J. expressed the
view that the decision of Spence J. in Eadie established a right to
recover moneys paid under a mistake of law where the parties are
'not in pari delicto'. In the present case, it was Craig J.'s opinion
that Ontario Hydro "had the primary obligation and responsibility
to observe the requirements of the Power Corporation Act; and
particularly of knowing what charges can be imposed on muncipalities and their utilities"'" and accordingly, that the plaintiff
should be entitled to succeed in the absence of any basis for holding
that it would be inequitable to allow recovery. The latter requirement was drawn from the famous passage from Moses v. Macferlan
where Lord Mansfield, in discussing the general nature of money
had and received claims, said that "the gist of this kind of action is,
that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged
by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the money." 2
The defendant was not so obliged in the present case, in Craig J.'s
view, for three reasons. First, relying for this point on the discussion
of the general principle of unjust enrichment found in Goff and
Jones, Craig J. noted that Ontario Hydro had in fact received no
benefit in the sense that the debits charged some municipalities were
matched by credits allocated to others. Secondly, Craig J. noted
that the source of funds to satisfy any judgment given would ultimately be municipal utilities and, accordingly, it would be impossible to restore the status quo ante. It was Craig J.'s view that
Hydro would have no claim against the older municipalities with
respect to the credits given and accordingly that all municipalities
would be required to bear the burden of any award to Nepean
through increased rates. This would impose, in effect, a "double
penalty" on some utilities. Thirdly, "in balancing the equities between the parties", Craig J. noted that Ontario Hydro was acting
bona fide and that "Nepean had ample opportunity to investigate
its legal rights and take legal advice in the first year or two of the
system - rather than waiting eight years." 73
The decision of Craig J. was upheld in the Ontario Court of
Appeal on the basis that "the trial Judge in the instant case was
entitled to consider the facts and factors which he did and the
unusual circumstances and history of the involvement of two statutory public bodies as well as their relationship to other public bod71 Id., at 502.
72 (176o)
2 BuRR. 1005, at 1O12; 97 E.R. 676, at 68t.
7- Supra, note

io, at 506 (ONT. H.C.).
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ies"' 4 and that the Court could not say that the trial Judge had
erred in concluding that it was inequitable to order Hydro to repay
the moneys paid. Although the Court agreed with Craig J.'s conclusion with respect to compulsion, it declined to pronounce on the
validity of his reading of the Eadie decision with respect to the in
pari delicto analysis. This issue did, however, receive extensive discussion in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada.
In the Supreme Court, the plaintiff again advanced the two
alternate grounds for relief, payment under compulsion and payment to a party not in pard delicto. The compulsion argument did
not receive elaborate consideration in the majority opinion of Estey
J. It appears that the majority accepted the findings below on this
point and felt no need to elaborate on them. Much greater attention
was paid to the "not in pari delicto" analysis and the insecure foundation for Spence J.'s extension of the prior law on this point in
Eadie was exposed at great length. Estey J. pointed out that the
Kiriri doctrine finds its basis in cases of illegal contract where the
plaintiff fits within a class protected by the statute and that the
doctrine has not historically been linked to the general problem of
recovering moneys paid under a mistake of law. This, of course, is a
perfectly defensible view from the perspective of stare decisis. In
suggesting that the "not in pai delicto" rule could apply generally
to facilitate recovery of moneys paid to a public authority, Spence J.
was introducing an innovation which appeared capable of quite
general application with the result that public authorities might well
be subjected, as a general matter, to restitutionary liability for
money paid under a mistake of law. Estey J. appeared to regard
this as an unsatisfactory development - Eadie is to be explained,
in Estey J.'s opinion, as a case of duress - and therefore reaffirmed
the general principle that moneys paid under a mistake of law
can not be recovered.
The policy basis for this reassertion of the binding force of the
mistake of law rule is to be found in the following passage in the
majority opinion:
These authorities, both old and current, relating to the situation
where a mistake of law alone is present, are founded, in my respectful view, on good sense and practicality. Certainty in commerce and
in public transactions such as we have here is an essential element
of the well-being of the community. The narrower rule applicable to
mistake of law as compared to that applicable to mistake of fact
-' Id., at 259

(ONT. C.A.).
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springs from the need for this security and the consequential freedom
from disruptive undoing of past concluded transactions. Mistake of
fact is, of course, limited to the parties and has no in rem consequences; hence the more generous view. In any event, nothing has
been brought to light in a review of the law by the parties on this
appeal to indicate any basis for the merging of the principles applicable to the categories of mistake, and indeed the wisdom embodied
in the authorities augurs for the maintenance of this ancient distinction. 75
It is surprising to find a doctrine riddled with exceptions, many of
them of a rather open-ended nature, defended on the basis of
"certainty". The more persuasive reason, with respect, appears to
be that hinted at in the discussion in this passage of the contrast
between the mistake of fact and mistake of law rules. Although the
reference to "in rem consequences" remains obscure to this writer at
least, the essential point appears to be that the granting of recovery
of moneys paid under a mistake of fact is more defensible inasmuch
as such mistakes would normally not have any impact beyond the
rights of the immediate parties; whereas a mistake of law, as in the
Nepean case itself, might be applicable to a broad range of transactions involving other parties. Although Estey J. does not expressly
link this point to the particular problems of public authorities, it
might further be suggested that this is indeed more likely to be the
case in a situation where the actions of a public authority are
attacked either on the basis that it has exceeded its statutory mandate or on the basis that it is acting under ultra vires legislation.
Perhaps it is not reading too much into the majority opinion, therefore, to suggest that this reaffirmation of the orthodox rule rests
ultimately on concern with respect to the possible financial disruption of a public authority which might result from the granting of
relief.
It has been argued above that there may well be room for legitimate concern with respect to potential disruption of this kind. It
should be emphasized, however, that a concern of this kind does not
appear to justify rigid adherence to the general rule that moneys
paid under a mistake of law can not be recovered. There are many
cases in which payments are made under a mistake of law which
do not give rise to a problem of this kind. In reality, the distinction
between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law does not distinguish
between cases where only the parties are involved on the one hand
and cases where transactions involving other parties are involved on
75 Id., at 243 (S.C.C.).
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the other. For this reason, it was argued above that an appropriate
response to this concern would be to articulate a rule that recovery
would not be allowed where to do so would place public finances
in a state of chaos. Even if one accepts that the potential for disruption of the finances of public authorities is a serious and legitimate concern, it is not at all necessary to preclude the recovery of
moneys paid under a mistake of law as a general matter or, indeed,
in the particular context of payments made to public authorities.
The majority opinion of Estey J. will no doubt be considered by

many to be rather disappointing. It reaffirms a private law rule
which has been thoroughly discredited and does so, moreover, in
the face of a dissenting opinion of Dickson J. which thoroughly
catalogues the traditional deficiencies of the rule and argues persuasively for its abolition. The Dickson opinion mounts the case
against the traditional rule with some care, quoting at length the
opinions of jurists and scholars on the question and subjecting a
number of the ambiguities of the general rule and its exceptions to
critical scrutiny. Dickson J. concluded "that the distinction between
mistake of law and mistake of fact serves no useful purpose" and
that "there is no compelling reason why recovery of payments made
under mistake should be denied simply by reason of the fact that
the mistake is one of law rather rather than of fact.""
Having reached the conclusion that recovery should be allowed
and the traditional distinction be abolished, Dickson J. found it
unnecessary to consider the in pari delicto argument based on the
Eadie decision. Dickson J. did, however, indicate his agreement
with the trial Judge that "the primary obligation for interpretation
of the relevant issue rests on the shoulders of Ontario Hydro" and
suggested that an alalogy could, in fact, be drawn from the in pari
delicto analysis of the Eadie case."7
Dickson J. drew support for his reshaping of the rules for recovery
of money paid under a mistake from previous case law in which the
Supreme Court of Canada has clearly adopted the unjust enrichment principle as the theoretical basis for the granting of relief in
restitutionary cases.s The rules permitting recovery of moneys paid
under a mistake of fact (and not under a mistake of law) are, of
course, a part of the old law of quasi-contract which is now generally considered to be a part of the law of restitution. These rules
76 Id., at 2o.
77 Id., at 211-12.
78 Id., at 209.
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are restated in the Restatement of Restitution 9 and are the subject
of extensive treatment in modem texts on the law of restitution. 0
The analysis of resitutionary claims on the basis of the unjust enrichment principle, set forth in the Restatement and embraced not
only by the Supreme Court of Canada but by many modem writers
on the subject, was put forth primarily as a basis for a rationalization and restatement of the existing rules of quasi-contract and
constructive trust. Recognition of the underlying principle of this
area of the law has, however, served to highlight the anomalous
nature of various aspects of the traditional rules of quasi-contract
and has provided a basis for restating them in a more coherent
manner. Thus, in Nepean, Dickson J. states that "[o]nce a doctrine
of restitution or unjust enrichment is recognized, the distinction as
to mistake of law and mistake of fact becomes simply meaningless."'"
It is perhaps not perfectly clear whether Dickson J. views the unjust
enrichment principle as simply the theoretical underpinning of an
existing body of doctrine which provides a basis for reshaping and
restating anomalous rules, or rather as a collateral or alternate theory
of liability which is to be added on to the causes of action established
in the old quasi-contract cases. The former view would be the more
orthodox interpretation of the role of the unjust enrichment principle and appears to be the position adopted by Dickson J. in another case. 2 It also would appear to underlie his conclusion in
Nepean that the traditional distinction between mistakes of fact and
law should henceforth be ignored.
It is difficult to understand why the majority of the Court did
not find the reasoning of Dickson J. convincing. On the general
question of whether the distinction between mistakes of fact and
those of law should be retained, it appears to be irresistible. Estey J.
responded on behalf of the majority in the following terms:
Since writing the foregoing I have had the opportunity of reading
the reasons of my colleague Dickson J. The thrust of the appellant's
79 Supra, note 3.

so See the texts referred to in id.
81 Supra, note io, at 209 (S.C.C.).
82 In Pettkus v. Becker [598o] 2 S.C.R. 834, at 847, 117 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 257,
at 273, Dickson J. expressed the view that the unjust enrichment principle
"lies at the heart of the constructive trust" and then went on to extend
the availability of constructive trust relief to the novel situation represented by the facts of that case. See also Rathwell v. Rathwell [1978] 2
S.C.R. 436, at 454, 83 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 289, at 305, per Dickson J.; and see
generally, J. D. McCamus, The Restitutionary Remedy of Constructive Trust
in Law Society of Upper Canada, SPECIAL LECTURES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE LAW OF REMEDIES (1981) 85.
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submission was centered on the question as to whether the parties
to the mistake of law were in pari delicto. Unjust enrichment is
mentioned in its factum only with reference to the argument that
the appellant and the respondent were not in pari delicto. In the
course of argument the appellant, in response to a question from the
Court, stated that it was not urging and not founding its appeal on
the abolition of the distinction in law between mistake of fact and
mistake of law. Indeed, the rule was accepted, and the application
sought in the appellant's argument was that said to have been
followed by this Court in Eadie v. Township of Brantford, supra.
Accordingly, my considerations have been confined to the operation
of the doctrine of mistake of law as argued. 3
There are a number of curious features to this passage. In the
previous paragraph of his judgment, Estey J. had opined that the
traditional rule was founded on "good sense and practicality" and
that "the wisdom embodied in the authorities augers for the maintenance of this ancient distinction." 4 Yet, in the above paragraph,
Estey J. appears to be suggesting that his opinion ought to be read
as if it assumed the existence of the traditional distinction rather
than defended or reaffirmed it. It is not at all clear whether it is
the view of the majority that the traditional rule could indeed be
subjected to reconsideration along the lines suggested by Dickson J.
were it not for the limited nature of the argument made on behalf
of the appellant. Although there are obvious reasons for declining
to decide cases for reasons which have not been argued by the
parties-indeed, it is of interest that Dickson and Estey JJ. found
themselves on opposite sides of this sort of issue in another recent
decision of the Court"- surely in a case such as this it would be
preferable to invite further argument rather than to leave the matter
in so uncertain a state. With respect to the concern expressed by
Estey J. that unjust enrichment was not generally pleaded, it may

be answered that it is not at all clear that the Court was not invited
to consider the merits of the appellant's claim on a broad restitutionary basis. The appellant's factum includes a submission to the
effect that "the limits of the doctrine of restitution have not yet been
fixed and this Court has the jurisdiction to grant restitutionary relief
in situations where it has not previously been granted, if the cirnote io, at 243 (S.C.0.).
Reproduced supra, at note 75.
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116 D.L.R. (3 d) i (S.C.C.), for a discussion of which, see A. Peltomaa,

Appellate Consideration of Issues Not Raised by Counsel: The Decision in
Homex Realty (1982) 3 Sup. CT. L. REV. 453.

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL.

17:2

cumstances justify such an expansion." 6 Although Dickson J.'s
opinion may seem rather a mighty oak when compared to this
modest acorn, there does appear to be some justification in the
material filed for Dickson J.'s view that a more broadly conceived
analysis was permissible in this case. To be sure, however, the failure
of counsel for the appellant to take the high road of arguing for the
abolition of the traditional rule creates some basis for the hesitancy
of the majority. More important, perhaps, the fate of the appellant's
strategy here offers a lesson of some interest to counsel concerning
the Court's willingness to reconsider the merits of quite wellentrenched doctrine.
The Dickson opinion is, in short, a tour de force. Although some
will no doubt derive comfort from the apparent suggestion of the
majority that the larger theoretical questions were not before the
Court and therefore remain at large, it is to be regretted that the
majority did not seize upon this occasion to resolve an ancient conundrum in the manner suggested by the dissenting opinion. It may
seem churlish, therefore, to argue that there may well be something
to be said for the result achieved by the majority and to argue that
the hesitancy of the majority to grant relief can be supported on
grounds which are, or at least should be considered to be, compatible with the new approach to mistaken payments advocated by
Dickson J. Problems for the position taken in dissent do arise with
respect to "what is perhaps the most difficult issue of the case", that
is, in the words of Dickson J.: "are there any equitable reasons
which preclude recovery by Nepean?" 7 At trial, as indicated above,
Craig J. held that there were three such reasons: first that Ontario
Hydro had not received a benefit, second that the burden of a judgment against Ontario Hydro could not be passed on to the true
beneficiaries of the original credits, and third that Nepean's failure
to investigate its rights in circumstances where it was aware that the
benefits were being passed on to other municipal utilities should
preclude it from recovery. The first two grounds raise squarely the
problem of whether the special characteristics of public authorities
suggest that there need be special defences in claims of this kind.
The third ground raises the more general question of whether a
failure to undertake enquiries should, in some circumstances at least,
be taken to be a basis for imposing the risk of error on the payer.
86 Appellan's Factum, p. 22, para. 61.
87 Supra, note to, at 212 (S.C.C.), per Dickson J.
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Dickson J. dismisses the first two points on the following grounds.
First, relying on the Storthoaks case, Dickson J. states that "[t]he
mere spending of money is not, of itself, sufficient to establish a
defence." 8 Accordingly, the mere fact that the payments received
from Nepean had been passed on in the form of credits to others
was, in his view, irrelevant. With respect to the second point, Dickson J. expressed the view that Craig J.'s concern with the ultimate
source of recovery would amount to a "means test", a consideration
not previously considered relevant in cases of this kind. 9 Moreover,
there did not appear to be a sufficient basis in the record at trial to
permit a finding as to "what manner and from what source Ontario
Hydro might properly pay any judgment recovered against it by
Nepean". Speculation with respect to this matter was said by Dickson J. to be "both unwise and unnecessary in the present litigation"."
It has been argued above that the special character of public
authorities does suggest that considerations such as these should
indeed be relevant in determining the appropriateness of imposing
liability on a public authority. The facts of the Nepean case do
provide an interesting context within which to test this proposition.
The effect of the holding in the case is that ratepayers living in
particular municipalities have been benefiting at the expense of
ratepayers in other municipalities by virtue of the Hydro pricing
mechanism. It is evident that any attempt to redress this difficulty
by requiring repayment by Ontario Hydro will result in an increase
in Hydro rates either across the province or with respect to particular municipalities. It may well be wondered whether this is a
satisfactory means of redress. In either case, a substantial proportion
of ratepayers will be required to pay yet again an increased rate as
a result of this billing practice. If the rates are increased across the
province, ratepayers who have lived for some period of time in an
overcharged municipality will again have their rates raised. If it
were possible to impose a higher rate only on those municipalities
that have received credit in the past, individual ratepayers who had
moved from a new municipality to an old or whose municipality
had been absorbed in the interim by an older municipality would
again be subjected to higher rates. Given the mobility of the population in the province and of municipal boundaries, it would appear
that significant unfairness would have resulted from the imposition
ss Id., at

214.

89 Id., at 216.
90 Id.
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of liability on Hydro in this case. When we look behind the respective public authorities to the individual ratepayers, there would
appear to be considerable difficulty in effecting a reasonable match
of ratepayer defendants who have benefited at the expense of a
group of ratepayer plaintiffs. Does this not suggest, then, that the
"mere spending of the money" is in these admittedly unusual circumstances a "change of position" by Hydro which arguably should
give rise to a defence to the claim? What is unusual about the case
is that over a long period of time revenues have been collected
through what is in essence a taxing system and redistributed throughout the system in such a way as to make it very difficult if not
impossible to recoup the value of benefits conferred from those who
have received them. The amounts involved, moreover, are rather
substantial. Something like thirty million dollars of overpayments
were made throughout the provincial power system 1 The larger
the amount, it might be argued, the more significant the unfairness
in a situation where it is impossible to accurately match those who
have provided benefits with those who have been unjustly enriched.
It might be thought that the Nepean facts are not particularly
troubling on this point, but these do at the very least appear to be
relevant considerations which might be dispositive in another case.
To the extent that the problem of affixing the burden of liability
on appropriate parties increases with the passage of time, it might
be thought that application of the doctrine of laches could provide
an appropriately traditional doctrinal basis for dismissing claims
which have become problematic for this reason. Interestingly, the
Law Reform Commission of British Columbia's Report on Benefits
Conferred Under a Mistake of Law, after canvassing difficulties of
this kind in the context of claims being made against municipalities,
recommends that a special limitation rule (requiring that such
claims be brought within two years of the payment) be included in
the Municipal Act.12 It is curious that the Report identifies this as
a problem only in the municipal context. While municipalities, and
especially small municipalities, may be especially vulnerable, the
potential difficulty of a major disruption to fiscal arrangements or
the difficulty, as in Nepean, of making an appropriate disposition
of the burden of liability, are problems which could arise in the
context of public authorities at all levels. If a limitation period is
91 Id., at 213.
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appropriate for municipalities, it is difficult to see why it would not
be appropriate for other public authorities as well. Quite apart from
the merits of the B.C. proposal, however, the Report does agree
that the difficulties inherent in the imposition of restitutionary liability on public authorities may substantially increase with time in
particular cases and in this way the Report may offer indirect support for the suggestion that a laches defence may be an appropriate
mechanism for dismissing daims where problems of this kind have
surfaced.
The third matter raised by Craig J. as a basis for an equitable
defence to the claim seems closely related to the general notion that
payments are irrecoverable if made in circumstances suggesting that
the risk of error has been assumed by the payer. There is support in
the mistake of fact cases for the proposition that in a situation
where an individual who "might by investigation learn the state of
facts more accurately,.., declines to do so, and chooses to pay the
money notwithstanding", recovery will be denied. In the words of
Goff and Jones, "a payment made in settlement of an honest claim
is irrecoverable.""4 Although there is considerable room for argument as to whether this principle ought to apply outside the context
of genuine agreements of compromise, Goff and Jones are on solid
ground in suggesting that in such circumstances relief has often
been denied in the past. Bilbie v. Lumley appears to be a case in
point?' If one accepts the validity of this proposition, there are a
number of circumstances in the fact situation of the Nepean case
which provide a basis for its application. Craig J., it will be recalled,
stressed that "Nepean had ample opportunity to investigate its legal
rights and take legal advice in the first year or two of the system rather than waiting eight years."' The majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada appeared similarly concerned that an enquiry
should have been made by Nepean at the time of payment. As the
majority opinion notes, the plaintiff and defendant are both "public
authorities operating under a statute enacted by the Legislature to
bring electric power at cost to all members of the provincial community. Each has its staff and organization, including legal ad93 Kelly v. Solari (1841)
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visors."' The billing arrangements under attack were the subject of
intense debate between the parties over several years. "Legal practitioners experienced in the field were present and available for
advice to the appellant at meetings."' Hydro obviously believed
that the scheme represented a valid exercise of its statutory powers
and it might be argued that the situation was one in which the
plaintiff should have appreciated that in the absence of timely
objection, it was reasonable for Hydro to assume that the lawfulness
of its billing practices was accepted by the plaintiff. Although these
points are made by the majority in the context of their extensive
rebuttal of the suggestion that the plaintiff was not in pari delicto
with the defendant, it is suggested here that these circumstances
could be offered as a factual basis for application of the traditional
proposition that recovery should be denied in cases where enquiry
has been waived.
I do not wish to suggest, however, that these points are unanswerable. It is not in my view self-evident that every "voluntary payment in submission to an honest claim" should be irrecoverable. In
the absence of an actual intention to compromise a claim, there
would appear to be no basis for engaging the policy of the common
law favouring the enforcement of compromises. 9 Further, even if
one accepts the validity of a more broadly conceived "voluntary
submission" principle along the lines suggested by Goff and Jones,
it is surely arguable that its legitimate range extends only to situations where the parties have some awareness of the potential for
legal uncertainty in their respective positions.' 0 There is no evidence
in Nepean to suggest that either party was conscious of any uncertainty with respect to the legal basis of Hydro's billing scheme, or
that payment was made with a view to "settling the matter." These
issues - the proper role of a "voluntary submission" principle and
its application in Nepean - are admittedly difficult ones. My
point, simply, is that these are matters on which reasonable opinion
could differ and on the basis of which the result advocated by the
majority could have been and can be defended.
97 Id., at 230 (S.C.C.).
9s Id., at 232.

99 For American support for the view that a "voluntary submission" principle
should operate only in the context of real compromises, see Phoenix Indemnity Company v. Steiden Stores (x954) 267 S.W. 2d 733, at 735.
100 This point is argued persuasively by Professor Palmer. See Palmer, supra,
note 56, v. III, at 341.
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Conclusion
The continued adherence of some judges to the rule that moneys
paid under a mistake of law are irrecoverable is a grave disappointment for those who wish to believe that the common law method,
whatever its deficiencies, has at least the virtue of being able, over
time, to work itself pure by reworking and ultimately rejecting
illogical and unsound doctrine. It is suggested here that this phenomenon may be explained, in part at least, by a particular concern
with the consequences of imposing restitutionary liability on public
authorities. Although there appear to be persuasive reasons for
concluding that public authorities should, perhaps more than other
types of defendants, be prepared to disgorge benefits obtained in
such circumstances, there does appear to be legitimate room for
concern with respect to the consequences of a general rule allowing
relief. In an extreme case, the granting of recovery could have a
seriously disruptive effect on public finances. In other circumstances,
the granting of relief may not achieve the principal objective of
restitutionary relief: the prevention of unjust enrichment of a defendant at the expense of a plaintiff. In identifying cases of the
latter variety, it may be useful to examine the relationship between
public authorities and their sources of revenue in order to determine
who has benefited from mistaken payments and who must ultimately bear the burden of their repayment. To the extent that such
concerns are legitimate the proper response to them is not continued
adherence to the general rule but, rather, recognition that the
special nature of public authorities as nonprofit bodies financed
by public revenues suggests that some care should be taken in fashioning defences, such as change of position and laches, to preclude
recovery from public authorities in appropriate circumstances.
Those who favour reform of the rule through abolition of the
distinction between mistakes of fact and those of law will find much
to admire in the recent Report of the Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia and in the dissenting opinion of Dickson J. in the
Nepean case. Those who favour reform through judicial restatement
will, however, be greatly disappointed by the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court of Canada in that case. Estey J. appears not
only to reaffirm the general rule but to reject the admittedly novel
extension of the "not in pari delicto" rule effected by Spence J. in
the Eadie case. If the majority opinion is to be taken as an authoritative pronouncement on this subject, plaintiffs seeking to impose
liability on public authorities will be forced to place greater reliance
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on the vagaries of the compulsion rule. The fact that the majority
ultimately took the view that the appellant had not squarely raised
an attack on the merits of the traditional rule and that this issue was
therefore not before the Court may, however, offer some encouragement to speculation that the views of the dissenting members of the
Court may prevail in the relatively near future.

